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Abstract
Corporate governance is an important element in monitoring the process of
financial reporting system. There are three monitoring mechanisms that are
theoretically used to ensure the credibility of corporate governance, namely,
external auditor, an internal auditing and the directorships. The trends of
corporate governance model in developed countries cannot explain the
reality of monitoring process of financial reporting in developing countries
especially in Asian countries like Malaysia. Therefore, it is important to
know to what extent the corporate governance of the Malaysian listed
companies has been effective in meeting the responsibility of monitoring the
process of financial reporting system? Generally, this study intended to
examine an effective component of corporate governance in a Malaysian
listed companies and relationship with the audit quality. A total of 655
companies were selected as the sample representing 73.84% of total number
of companies across industries in year 2003. The analysis of logistic regression
was used to investigate the relationship between dependent and independent
variables. Results show that two independent variables had a significant
relationship with audit firm size. They were board independence and non-
financial institutional ownership. The executive directors’ ownership and
CEO/chairman had a negative relationship but not significant with audit
quality. Whereas non-executive directors’ ownership and financial
institutional ownership showed a positive relationship with audit quality
however, it was not significant. The findings posit that both board
independence and institutional ownership are important factors to the
companies listed at Bursa Malaysia perform effectively. These two elements
will improve the decision making process to be more transparent and
objective and enhance the independence in selecting quality of external
auditor. This study suggests that companies tend to audit by Big 4 if the level
of board independence and institutional ownership increase. So, these
criteria should be taken seriously by companies’ top management as well as
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regulator in order to increase the audit quality and then the quality of financial
reporting.
Keywords: corporate governance, board independent, directors’ ownership, institutional
ownership, CEO duality, big 4, audit quality
Introduction
In recent years, increasing attention has been paid to the quality of corporate financial
reporting by regulatory authorities as there were series of audit failures among corporate
companies. This has led to undermined investors’ confidence in the quality and reliability
of the corporate financial systems. Apart from that, the collapse of several large companies
in the United State such as Enron, Arthur Andersen and WorldCom, Pramalat in Italy
caused by alleged financial statements fraud has created the awareness for the need of
producing a quality of corporate financial reporting. An important monitoring of the
financial reporting process is the statutory audit whose objective is to provide independent
verification of the financial statements prepared by management. Thus, the quality and
reliability of published audited financial statements are essential elements to regain the
investors’ confidence. These essential elements have given rise to the importance of
corporate governance to be given its due role.
The quality of an audit effect the likelihood an auditor will discover material misstatement
and report it in the client’s accounting system (DeAngelo, 1981). Therefore, the higher of
audit quality will increase a greater chance to detect of any misstatements in the client’s
financial reporting. If the quality of an audit is high, then shareholders gain access to
information that is more useful. This, in turn, reduces information asymmetry in the capital
market. Past studies found that an audit quality had a significant relationship with several
components of corporate governance (O’Sullivan, 2000; Beasly and Petroni, 2001; Kane
and Velury, 2002; Carcello, Hermanson, Neal and Riley, 2002; Salleh, Stewart and Manson,
2006; Yatim, Kent and Clarkson, 2006; Mitra, Hossain and Deis, 2007). The components
were independent of the board of directors as well as independent of the audit committee,
non-executive directors’ ownership and institutional ownership. Fama (1980) and Fama
and Jensen (1983) argued that the board of directors performed the important function of
monitoring the actions of top management.
Most of the previous studies related to corporate governance mechanism and audit
quality as well as financial reporting quality concentrated on developed countries.
Developing countries, like Malaysia has different corporate governance models and
corporate culture that may be lead to the different influences on audit quality. In addition
the Asian of financial crisis occurred in 1997-98 shows that majority of big companies
among Asian countries did not have strong corporate governance because they could
not survive well during that crisis. Therefore, that is very important to examine to what
extent the corporate governance of Malaysian companies has been effective in meeting
the responsibility of monitoring the process of financial reporting system? To meet this
question, this study list several objectives.
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Generally, this study intended to examine the effective components of corporate
governance in Malaysia listed companies and its relationship with the audit quality.
Thus, the objectives of the study were mainly a) to identify the board composition
among Malaysian listed companies, b) to determine the structure of board ownership
and institutional ownership in the listed companies, c) to determine the structure of the
existence of CEO Chairman (CEO duality) among Malaysian listed companies and lastly
d) to examine the relationship between board composition, board ownership, institutional
ownership and CEO duality on audit quality.
Corporate Governance Mechanism and Audit Quality
The key elements of the accountability framework for corporation are financial reporting,
non-executive directors and audit (Spira, 2001). An efficient corporate governance
mechanism and audit quality are two important elements to the company especially for
the group of big companies in order to ensure the credibility of internal control and
monitoring of financial reporting system. Both components complement each other
and it is expected to have a close relationship. Good corporate governance mechanism
are attempted to acquire a high quality of audit services for the company. Similarly to
the quality auditors where they are assumed to constantly improve the quality of
corporate governance mechanism of their clients. The agency theory has been used to
explain the demand for effective corporate governance mechanism and audit quality.
Audit quality is an important element to ensure the credibility of corporate governance
as well as financial reporting process. It is a broader concept and in a very subjective
definition. Some studies (O’Sullivan, 2000; Carcello et. al., 2002; Salleh et. al., 2006; Yatim
et. al., 2006; Mitra et. al., 2007) use the amount of audit fees to measure audit quality.
High amount of audit fees indicate that auditors provide more and efficient audit services
compared to low audit fees. However some researchers (DeAngelo, 1981; Palmrose,
1986; Palmrose, 1987; Knapp, 1991; Colbert and Murray, 1998; Beasley and Petroni, 2001)
argued that the big size of audit firm especially Big Eight firm as the best indicator to
audit quality because this category of audit firm provided higher audit quality than the
smaller audit firm.
This category of firms normally has more audit expertise, efficient and effective audit team
and more experiences collected from around the world in terms of providing audit services.
Higher audit fees among Big Eight firm is found closely related. Palmrose (1986) documented
that there is a statistically significant association between auditor size and audit fees
based on a Big Eight/non-Big Eight dichotomy. The results support the argument that the
Big Eight designation is a quality surrogate, in that increased hours by Big Eight auditors
would reflect greater productive activities (evidence acquisition) in providing higher
levels of assurance (higher quality) to clients.
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Literature Review and Hypotheses Development
Before 1990s the importance of corporate governance was ignored by most of the top
management around the world. However, since the series of corporate collapses occurred
in early 2000s in developed and developing countries, researchers as well as academicians
have been very interested to discover and explore an internal and external mechanism of
corporate governance and their contributions to the company. The weakness of corporate
governance is the main and important factor blamed for the corporate failure consequences
from the economics and corporate crisis. There is much that can be done to improve the
integrity of financial reporting through greater accountability, the restoration of resources
devoted to audit function, and better corporate governance policies (Saudagaran, 2003)
Among the important internal corporate governance mechanisms euphasized by previous
researchers are board composition (O’Sullivan, 2000; Beasley and Petroni, 2001; Salleh
et. al., 2006; Yatim et. al., 2006), ownership by directors and outside investors, ownership
by financial institutional and non-institutional (O’Sullivan, 2000; Kane and Velury, 2002;
Mitra et. al., 2007), and CEO/Chairman (O’Sullivan, 2000; Salleh et. al., 2006). These
selected internal mechanisms of corporate governance show a significant relationship
with audit quality whether in form of audit size or audit fees. The quality of an external
auditor is an effective external mechanism to enhance the quality of corporate governance
systems in the company besides the internal mechanism of corporate governance.
Board Independence
Fama and Jensen (1983) have theorized that the board of directors is the best control
mechanism to monitor actions of management. They focus board independence based
on the agency theory. Outside directors, as representatives of shareholders, have a
particularly strong incentive to prevent and detect such opportunities reporting behaviour
by management (Fama and Jensen, 1983). This incentive potentially is driven by three
factors. Firstly, the directors may seek to protect their reputations as experts in monitoring,
because the market for directors punishes those associated with corporate disasters or
poor performance.
Secondly, from a legal liability perspective, directors who fail to exercise reasonable care
in discharging their monitoring responsibilities are subject to severe sanctions. Thirdly,
shareholders often suffer significant losses in the wake of financial reporting problems,
so directors seeking to protect shareholder wealth may seek differentially higher-quality
audit services (Carcello et. al., 2002). Therefore, outside directors are expected to be more
concerned with audit quality than executive directors, who face greater conflicts of interest.
Beasley and Petroni (2001) argue that boards with higher percentage of outside directors
will seek higher quality auditors in order to provide more effective monitoring of corporate
management.
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Past study (O’Sullivan, 2000; Salleh et. al., 2006) found that the proportion of non-executive
directors had a significant positive impact on audit quality. They suggested that non-
executive directors encouraged more intensive audits as a complement to their own
monitoring role while the reduction in agency costs expected through significant managerial
ownership resulted in a reduced need for intensive auditing. In addition, Jensen and
Meckling (1976) highlight that auditing is also one method of ensuring that managers will
act in the best interest of the outside shareholders. This argument led to the following
hypothesis.
H1: There is a significant positive relationship between board independence and audit
quality.
Directors’ Ownership
Directors are encouraged to have their own portion of ownership in the corporation. This
portion ownership is important to the company because it will be expected to have influence
on audit quality. However, executive and non-executive directors’ ownership is expected
to have different impact on audit quality. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that agency
conflicts between managers and shareholders may be reconciled when managers possess
an ownership interest in their companies. The rationale to invite directors especially non-
executive to have a portion of ownership in the corporation is to reduce a gap between
director’s interest and the interest of shareholders as well as the corporation. It is hope
then the interest of both parties can be aligned. Byrd and Hickman (1992) found evidence
that shareholders got benefits when managers and independent outside directors owned
at least a small fraction of the bidding firm’s common stock.
In Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) convergence of the interest model, an increase in the
proportion of the firm’s equity owned by insider is expected to increase firm value as the
interests of inside and external shareholders are realigned. However, when managers own
a significant portion of equity they have less incentive to issue misleading information to
shareholders so auditors are less likely to need undertake additional testing (O’Sullivan,
2000). He found that audit quality was negatively related to the proportion of equity
owned by executive directors. Mitra et al. (2007) also documented that managerial stock
ownership was negatively associated with audit fees. Based on the above discussion the
following hypotheses were developed.
H2: There is a significant positive relationship between non-executive directors’ ownership
and audit quality.
H3: There is a significant negative relationship between executive directors’ ownership
and audit quality.
Institutional Ownership
In contrast to the directors’ ownership, an institutional ownership is an investment from
a group of outside investor or investment from a certain institution. The percentage of
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ownership from institution is normally higher than individual investor. It is assumed that
institutional investors have more influence than other individual investor. With the high
portion of ownership, institutional ownership has the important of monitoring role in the
process auditing. It is rational that institutional investors demand high quality information
from the company.
Kane and Velury (2002) observe that the greater the level of institutional ownership, the
more likely it is that a firm purchases audit services from large audit firm in order to ensure
high audit quality. For the purpose of the study, institutional ownership can be separated
into two main categories which are financial institutional and non-financial institutional
ownership. The main difference between both groups is related to core business of
investor. The core business of financial institutions is investment but not for non-financial
institutions. However, both institutions are expected not to have different influence on
audit quality.
Mitra et. al. (2007) found that diffused institutional ownership was significantly and
positively related to audit fees. They attribute this finding to either institutional investor
demand for the purchase of high quality audit services as safeguard against fraudulent
financial reporting or firms’ endeavor to purchase high quality audits to attract institutional
investment in common stock. It is expected that the portion of institutional ownership will
have impact on audit quality of the company. Therefore, the following hypotheses were
developed:
H4: There is a significant positive relationship between non-financial institutional
ownership and audit quality.
H5: There is a significant positive relationship between financial institutional ownership
and audit quality.
CEO Duality
This study also intended to discover the relationship between the CEO duality and audit
quality. The CEO duality refers to non-separation of roles between CEO and the chairman
of the board. In the normal situation, boards with CEO duality are perceived ineffective
because a conflict of interest may arise. This characteristic of corporate governance is
normal in Malaysian situation. It may be because of the nature of family own business in
developing countries like Malaysia. It shows that big sizes of companies that separate
person for the both functions normally trade at the higher price to book multiplies (Yermack,
1996) and have higher return on assets and cost efficiency ratios (Pi and Timme, 1993).
According to the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (2000) best practice,
Malaysian companies are recommended to split the function of CEO and the Chairman of
the board to ensure a balance of power and authority, such that no one individual has
unfettered power in decision making. It is expected that in the presence of a dominant
CEO duality, the company intends to reduce the effort to acquire quality auditor. It hopes
that corporate governance is better without CEO duality in the corporation. This practice
is also recommended by other codes of corporate governance, including those available
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in developed countries. Some studies (O’Sullivan, 2000; Salleh et. al., 2006) did not show
significant evidence on the relationship between CEO duality and audit fees. This study
expected that there was a negative relationship between both variables through the
following hypothesis:
H6: There is a significant negative relationship between CEO duality and audit quality.
Methodology
Sample and Data Collection
This study used the secondary data as the main source of information analysis. The
information relating to the composition of outside director members of board, composition
of outside director members of audit committee, directors’ ownership for executive and
non-executive director, institutional ownership for financial and non-financial institution,
CEO duality, size of audit firm, total assets, total accounts receivable, total inventory and
total debts were collected from company annual reports.
A total of 655 companies were selected as sample representing 73.84% of total number of
companies across industries that are listed both on the Main Board and Second Board in
year 2003. Table 1 summarizes the distribution of sample by industry and audit firm size.
Table 1: Distribution of sample by Industry and Audit Firm Size
Industry Big 4 Non-Big 4 Total
No % No %
Consumer Products 62 55.36 50 44.64 112
Industrial Products 123 61.81 76 38.19 199
Trading/Services 94 64.38 52 35.62 146
Construction 24 51.06 23 48.94 47
Property 52 65.00 28 35.00 80
Plantation 35 92.11 3 7.89 38
Technology 11 57.89 8 42.11 19
Mining 6 100.00 0 0.00 6
Infrastruc. Project Com. 7 87.5 1 12.5 8
Total 414 63.21 214 36.79 655
Independent Variables
Six independent variables of the study were board independence, executive directors’
ownership, non-executive directors’ ownership, financial institutional ownership, non-
financial institutional ownership and CEO duality where the dependent variable was audit
quality, which was measured by size of audit firm. Three independent control variables
were also included in the model, they were size of company, business complexity and level
of leverage.
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Operationalization of Variables
The analysis of logistic regression was used to examine the relationship between dependent
and independent variables. The functional form of the logistic regression model is as
follows:
Aud_Quality = α + β1Ind_BOD + β2ExDir_Own + β3NexDir_Own + β4FIns_Own +β5NFIns_Own + β6CEO_Cman +β7Size_Com + β8Buss_Com + β9Leverage_Com + ε
The definition and operationalization of dependent variable, independent variables and
control variables were based on the following manner. The dichotomous dependent
variable, audit quality was set equal to one if the company audited by Big 4 audit firm,
otherwise, zero (Kane and Velury, 2002). Big 4 audit firms were assumed to have quality of
audit services compared to non-Big 4 audit firm.
There were six independent variables includes in the above model. The following measures
were based on the previous studies (O’Sullivan, 2000; Beasley and Petroni; Carcello et.
al., 2002; Salleh et. al., 2006; Yatim et. al., 2006; Mitra et. al., 2007). Board independence
was measured through the composition of non-executive in board of directors (BOD) in
form of percentage. The non-executive and executive directors’ ownership depended on
the percentage of shares owned. Similarly, the portions of ownership by non-financial
and financial institution were calculated through the percentage shares owned. The variable
of CEO Chairman was a dichotomous variable that operated as one if the company has
CEO and also Chairman, otherwise, zero.
There were three control variables included in this research model namely, size, business
complexity and leverage of company. The variables were found to have significant
relationships with the audit quality (Kane and Velury, 2002). However, it was not the objective
of this study to examine these variables. The size of the company was measured by the total
assets owned in Ringgit Malaysia (RM) whereby the business complexity was measured
equal to [(total accounts receivable + total inventory)/total assets] and lastly the company
leverage was equal to total debts divided by total assets (Kane and Velury, 2002).
Results of Analysis
Analysis of Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 presents the mean, median and standard deviation for each variable in the study.
The table shows about 63% of the companies audited by Big 4. 78% of audit committee
members are non-executive directors compared to board of director members who are
non-executive directors, 63%. Ownership by executive directors, 8.7% is higher than
ownership by non-executive directors, 2.6%. Non-financial institutional ownership is
44% contrasted to financial institutional ownership is just only 8.2%. Only about 45% of
companies have CEO and also as chairman of board of directors.
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Analysis of Logistic Regression
The analysis of logistic regression was done to test the hypothesis of H1, H2, H3, H4, H5
and H6. The test of multicollinearity was run before analyzing the logistic regression
model. This test used the correlation test of Pearson among independent variables. The
results show low coefficient correlations indicating no multicollinearity problems among
independent variables except for audit committee independence, which was 0.56. So,
audit committee independence was not included in the analysis of logistic regression.
Results of the analysis logistic regression are summarized in Table 3.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Variables
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Audit firm size 0.6321 1.0000 0.4826 0.0000 1.0000
Board independence 0.6325 0.6250 0.1892 0.0000 1.0000
Audit committee 0.7814 0.7500 0.1573 0.0000 1.0000
independence
Executive directors’ 8.766E-02 7.200E-03 0.1425 0.0000 0.7075
ownership
Non-executive 2.683E-02 4.000E-04 6.990E-02 0.0000 0.5511
directors’ ownership
Financial institutional 8.248E-02 3.430E-02 0.1305 0.0000 0.8094
ownership
Non-financial 0.4454 0.4639 0.1936 0.0000 0.8855
institutional ownership
CEO and chairman 0.4595 0.0000 0.4987 0.0000 1.0000
Table 3: Results of Analysis Logistic Regression
Independence Expected Estimated Wald χ2 Value of p
Variables direction of parameters
relationship
Constant + -1.516 14.282 0.000
Board independence + 1.586 8.665 0.003*
Exe ownership - -0.490 0628 0.428
Non-exe ownership + 0.326 0.066 0.798
Fin ownership + 1.518 3.440 0.064
Non-fin ownership + 1.240 6.123 0.013*
CEO and chairman - 0.053 0.083 0.774
Size + 0.000 4.120 0.042*
Business complexity + 1.942 19.656 0.000*
Leverage + -0.010 0.001 0.978
Cox & Snell R2 0.87
Nagelkerke R2 0.119
No. of companies Big 414
4 audit firm
No. of companies not 241
using Big 4 audit firm
Total sample 655
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The above table shows the value of Nagelkerke R2 is 0.119 and Cox & Snell R2 is 0.87.
Results show that two independent variables namely board independence and non-
financial institutional ownership had a significant relationship with audit firm size. Board
independence had a significant positive relationship with the audit firm size at p=0.003.
This finding supports H1. It means that the higher level of board independence will
increase the tendency of selecting Big 4 by companies as an auditor.
Therefore, we can conclude that the board independence has a potential element to
increase the quality of auditing for companies. This result is consistent with studies of
O’sullivan (2000); Beasly and Petroni (2001); Carcello et. al. (2002) and Salleh et. al. (2006)
which is indicates that the proportion of non-executive directors has a significant positive
impact on audit quality.
The study also finds that non-financial institutional ownership is significantly related to
the audit firm size at p=0.013. This findings support H4. Its means that the higher level of
ownership by non-financial institution will increase the tendency of companies choose
Big 4 as their external auditor. The results support the findings by Kane and Velury
(2002)’s and Mitra et. al (2007)’s studies.
The executive directors’ ownership had a negative relationship but was not significant
with audit quality. The value of estimated parameters was –0.490. Hence, this finding did
not support H3. It is consistent with the study by O’sullivan (2000) and Mitra et. al (2007)
who found that audit quality was negatively related to the proportion of equity owned by
executive directors.
Results for independent variables such as, non-executive directors’ ownership, financial
institutional ownership showed a positive relationship but it was not significant with
audit quality. The CEO chairman showed a negative relationship with audit quality. So,
these results did not support H2, H5 and H6. However, these three variables still showed
correlation with the quality of audit. May be the limitation of the study influenced the
result found.
Discussions and Conclusions
The main objective of the study was to examine the selected qualities of corporate
governance mechanism in influencing the audit quality of the company. Specifically, this
study concentrated on independence directors, executive directors and non-executive
directors’ ownership, financial and non-financial institutional ownership and CEO duality.
Each variable was expected to have influence on audit quality whether positively or
negatively related and then six hypotheses were developed in order to test each variable.
The previous discussion shows the analysis of results for each of these hypotheses.
The findings show that both board independence and institutional ownership are two
important factors that could assist companies listed at Bursa Malaysia to perform
effectively. These two elements will improve the decision making process to be more
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independent, transparent and objective especially in selecting an external auditor. Evidence
from this study shows that the company tends to audit by Big 4 if the level of board
independence and institutional ownership increase. So, these criteria should be taken
seriously by companies’ top management in order to increase the audit quality and
subsequently the quality of financial reporting.
Even though another four variables of executive director and non-executive director
ownership, financial institutional ownership and CEO/Chairman were not found to be
significant, these variables still have a correlation to audit quality at certain levels. This
finding warrants more investigation through the addition of other variables or through a
change of the combination of variables. The regulators and management of the company
have not ignored these variables in improving the rules and regulations related to form
effective corporate governance as well as effective management.
Based on the findings of this study, we recommend that (i) the composition of non-
executive directors in board of directors should be increased in order to increase the level
of board independence to more than 80%; (ii) institutional ownership especially from
non-financial institution should be encouraged in order to maintain the quality of financial
reporting; (iii) the ownership by executive directors’ should decrease to a minimum level
because of a negative relationship existing between executive directors’ ownership and
audit quality; and lastly (iv) the functions of the CEO and the Chairman should be
segregated to different officers in order to increase the efficiency of internal control
system.
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